

STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OPINION NO. 99-10

CASE 99-C-0529 - Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to
Reexamine Reciprocal Compensation.

OPINION AND ORDER
CONCERNING RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION

Issued and Effective: August 26, 1999

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BY THE COMMISSION:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

By order issued April 15, 1999, we instituted this proceeding "to reexamine reciprocal compensation, particularly costs and rate structures applicable to large-volume call termination to single customers."¹ "Reciprocal compensation" refers to an arrangement between two local exchange carriers in which each carrier compensates the other for the transport and termination on the second carrier's network facilities of calls originating on the first carrier's facilities. These arrangements, introduced in New York in 1995, are now governed by the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act) and various rules and decisions of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

The present inquiry grows out of an unanticipated development: a substantial imbalance in traffic flows (and, in consequence, revenue streams) between incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) and some competing local exchange carriers (CLECs) having a preponderance of customers, such as

¹ Case 99-C-0529, Order Instituting Proceeding to Reexamine Reciprocal Compensation (issued April 15, 1999)(the Instituting Order), p. 4.

Internet service providers (ISPs), that receive far more calls than they make. To put the matter in context, it is necessary to describe in some detail the history and legal framework of reciprocal compensation in general.

Early New York Decisions

In our 1995 "Framework Order,"² we adopted a reciprocal compensation plan under which local exchange carriers (LECs) were to compensate one another for calls terminated on one another's networks. The compensation mechanism was to be cost-based (i.e., was to exclude the contribution to universal service costs included in the access charges paid by inter-exchange carriers to LECs completing calls on their behalf), mutual, and symmetrical. These cost-based arrangements were to be available only to facilities-based full-service providers (FSPs), who, by the nature of their operations, directly supported universal service; other carriers would be required to pay the higher carrier access charges for call termination.

In adopting the reciprocal compensation regime, we considered and rejected an alternative, termed "bill-and-keep," under which carriers would not pay one another for completing calls but would simply bill their own end-users and retain the resulting revenues. (In general, CLECs had favored bill-and-keep, fearing that they would send more calls to the incumbent's network for completion than they would receive and therefore be net losers under a reciprocal compensation arrangement; ILECs, sharing the same assumptions, had favored reciprocal compensation.) We rejected bill-and-keep as less cost-based, inasmuch as it would reflect actual costs only if traffic flows between carriers were at least roughly in balance. Finally, we noted that carriers could negotiate terms differing from those we adopted, as those terms were

² Case 94-C-0095, Competition II Proceeding, Order Instituting Framework for Directory Listings, Carrier Interconnection and Intercarrier Compensation (issued September 27, 1995).

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made available to other carriers on a non-discriminatory
basis.

The 1996 Act as Interpreted by the FCC

To state the matter most generally, the federal reciprocal compensation provisions, like those we had adopted earlier, call for mutual reimbursement of termination costs measured by reference to the incremental costs of the ILEC, which are to serve as a proxy for the CLEC's costs unless the CLEC proves its costs are, in fact, higher. More specifically, the 1996 Act imposes on all local exchange carriers "the duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications."³ The terms for reciprocal compensation are to be set forth in inter-carrier interconnection agreements, reviewed or arbitrated by the state commissions, pursuant to the general scheme of the 1996 Act. In addition, the competitive checklist that must be met under the 1996 Act by a Bell Operating Company seeking authority to provide long-distance service includes reciprocal compensation arrangements that meet the 1996 Act's pricing standards.⁴

Those pricing standards specify that terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation may be considered just and reasonable only if they "(i) . . . provide for the mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination of calls that originate on the network facilities of the other carrier; and (ii) . . . determine such costs on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such calls."⁵ These requirements, however, do not preclude "the mutual recovery of costs through the offsetting of reciprocal

³ 47 U.S.C. '251(b)(5).

⁴ 47 U.S.C. '271 (c)(2)(B)(xiii).

⁵ 47 U.S.C. '252(d)(2)(A).

obligations, including arrangements that waive mutual recovery (such as bill-and-keep arrangements)"⁶; but the FCC has determined that bill-and-keep may be imposed by a state commission only "if traffic is roughly balanced in the two directions and neither carrier has rebutted the presumption of symmetrical rates."⁷ In addition, the statutory requirements do not "authorize the [FCC] or any State commission to engage in any rate regulation proceeding to establish with particularity the additional costs of transporting or terminating calls, or to require carriers to maintain records with respect to the additional costs of such calls."⁸

The FCC has determined as well that reciprocal compensation rates, like those for unbundled network elements generally, must be set on the basis of forward-looking economic costs, estimated in accordance with the Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) method.⁹ In most cases, however, payments to a CLEC for terminating calls originating on an ILEC network are not to be set on basis of the CLECs own costs; instead, they are to be set symmetrically, on the basis of the ILEC's costs unless a CLEC presents a cost study showing its own costs to be higher and thereby rebutting the

⁶ 47 U.S.C. '252(d)(2)(B)(i).

⁷ CC Docket No. 96-98, et al., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, et al., First Report and Order (released August 8, 1996)(Local Competition Order), &1112.

⁸ 47 U.S.C. '252(d)(2)(B)(ii).

⁹ Local Competition Order, &1056. We have done so; existing reciprocal compensation rates are based on the TELRIC costs of the underlying network elements as determined in the First Network Elements Proceeding (Cases 95-C-0657 et al.) and subject to reexamination in the Second Network Elements Proceeding (Case 98-C-1357). For that reason, the present proceeding considers what equipment may be used to terminate particular types of traffic but does not attempt to determine unit costs of any such equipment. States may also use a default proxy set by the FCC, not pertinent here, or, in appropriate situations, bill-and-keep arrangements.

presumption of symmetry. In reaching that decision, the FCC reasoned, among other things, that the ILEC's costs would be a reasonable presumptive proxy for those of the CLEC inasmuch as both would be serving in the same geographic area; that symmetric compensation might reduce an ILEC's ability to use its bargaining strength to negotiate termination charges that were seriously asymmetric in its favor; and that symmetrical rates would be administratively easier to manage and would avoid requiring CLECs to perform costly forward-looking economic cost studies (unless they undertook to do so in an effort to rebut the presumption of symmetry and show their costs exceeded the ILEC's).¹⁰

The FCC further noted that the "additional costs" referred to in the statute as recoverable are primarily the traffic-sensitive component of local switching, together with a reasonable allocation of common costs.¹¹ Costs will vary, however, depending on the type of switching involved, and states may establish rates that differ on that basis.¹² In traditional ILEC network architecture, customers are connected to end office switches, groups of which are connected to each other through tandem switches. The tandems reduce the need for inter-office transport facilities and make the system correspondingly more efficient. CLECs, however, may use different technologies to perform functions equivalent to those performed by an ILEC through the use of tandem switches; a CLEC with a particular number and dispersion of customers, for example, may find it efficient to substitute transmission facilities for tandem switching in a manner that would be inefficient for an ILEC. The FCC therefore concluded that

¹⁰ Local Competition Order, §§1085-1090.

¹¹ Ibid., §§1057-1057.

¹² Ibid., §1090. Bell Atlantic-New York takes the position that while the FCC spoke explicitly only of separate rates for tandem and end-office termination (next defined), it did not preclude disparate rates for other categories, as long as they are applied symmetrically.

"where the [CLEC's] switch serves a geographic area comparable to that served by the incumbent LEC's tandem switch, the appropriate proxy for the [CLEC's] additional costs is the [incumbent's] tandem interconnection rate,"¹³ which will be higher than its end-office interconnection rate. These two rates--the tandem switching rate and the end-office switching rate--along with the concept of "functional equivalence" between an ILEC's tandem switch and a CLEC's differently configured network capable of serving the same geographic area, figure prominently in the proposals under consideration in this case.

The FCC also determined that reciprocal compensation arrangements apply only to local traffic, and that long-distance traffic remains subject to the carrier access charge regime. It allowed the states to determine the areas to be considered local for these purposes.¹⁴

More recently, in February 1999, the FCC determined that traffic directed to an ISP was, in fact, largely interstate (in that it did not terminate at the ISP's local server but continued to Internet websites often in other states) and therefore not subject to its reciprocal compensation rule. It instituted proposed rulemaking on the subject but determined, at least for the time being, that carriers remained bound by their existing interconnection agreements, as interpreted by state commissions, and that states remained free to apply reciprocal compensation to ISP traffic.¹⁵ (Nearly all states that have considered the matter

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Ibid., §§1034-1035.

¹⁵ CC Docket No. 96-98, Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and CC Docket No. 99-68, Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (released February 26, 1999)(FCC ISP Ruling). Bell Atlantic-New York and its affiliates have brought suit against this aspect of the FCC's decision, contending that state commissions lack authority to impose reciprocal

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have continued to apply reciprocal compensation to this traffic. The sole exceptions to date are Massachusetts, which, having initially applied reciprocal compensation on the premise that the traffic was intrastate, reversed itself in light of the contrary FCC decision,¹⁶ and New Jersey.)

The Current Situation

Consistent with these legal requirements, the tariffs of New York Telephone Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-New York (Bell Atlantic-New York) provide for reciprocal compensation at the higher tandem or lower end-office rate (termed, respectively, "Meet Point B" and "Meet Point A"), depending on the nature and location of the interconnection. A Meet Point A interconnection (at an end-office switch) will permit a CLEC to hand off traffic for delivery to any customer served by the end-office switch. A Meet Point B interconnection (at a tandem switch) will permit the handing off of traffic for delivery to any customer served by any of the end offices subtending the tandem. The Meet Point A (end-office) rate is equal to the sum of the rates for switch usage and a common trunk port. The Meet Point B (tandem) rate is equal to the sum of the rates for a tandem trunk port, end-office-to-tandem common trunking and associated trunk port costs, tandem switch usage, and end-office switch usage.

The rates for both types of connection are based on costs as determined in the First Network Elements Proceeding, and are subject to modification in light of the conclusions to be reached in the Second Network Elements Proceeding. Most (but not all) interconnection agreements between Bell Atlantic-New York and CLECs defer to the tariffed rates, some

compensation plans for Internet-bound traffic. Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 14, n. 32.

¹⁶ MCI WorldCom Inc. against New England Telephone and Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-Massachusetts, Mass. D.T.E. 97-116. The Massachusetts case was decided by a 3-2 vote.

of them providing for a "blended" rate lying between those parameters and, in some cases, subject to change as the CLEC's network evolves; any change in the tariffed rates resulting from this proceeding would flow through to the rates charged under those agreements. Reciprocal compensation for Frontier Telephone of Rochester (Frontier) is governed by its 1994 Open Market Plan (OMP), which incorporates a negotiated, above-cost rate that will remain in place (except where otherwise provided in particular interconnection agreements) until the OMP expires, or unless we decide in this proceeding to modify it.¹⁷

The effects of reciprocal compensation as now structured have been greatly affected by the unexpectedly rapid growth of the Internet and of other services (such as "chatlines") that generate very large volumes of traffic inbound to individual customers who produce far smaller volumes of outbound traffic. (This type of traffic is sometimes referred to as "convergent.") Many Internet service providers and chatlines are served by CLECs; as a result, ILECs, whose own customers direct many calls to ISPs and chatlines but receive very few in return, may end up paying out much more in reciprocal compensation than they take in. In the most extreme situations, discussed below, it is alleged that some CLECs are nothing more than ISPs that have adopted the trappings of CLECs solely to receive a reciprocal compensation revenue stream. Even in less extreme situations, it is argued that some CLECs are serving a niche market that is made lucrative by a perverse regulatory anomaly rather than by the underlying economics of the situation.

¹⁷ Cases 95-C-0657 et al. and 93-C-0033 et al., First Network Elements Proceeding and Rochester Telephone Corp. - Rate Stability Agreement, Opinion No. 99-8 (issued July 22, 1999), mimeo pp. 25-27. To avoid terminological confusion, it should be noted that Frontier, in contrast to other parties, generally associates "tandem switching" with the lower of the two reciprocal compensation rates; it characterizes the higher rate as recovering the costs of tandem switching plus end office switching and termination.

These developments, and efforts by Bell Atlantic-New York and Frontier to discontinue reciprocal compensation payments associated with Internet traffic, led us to institute an inquiry in July 1997 (the ISP Case). Bell Atlantic-New York contended, among other things, that because calls to ISPs did not in fact terminate at the ISP but were ultimately delivered to host computers, many of which were out-of-state, the calls should be seen as interstate and, accordingly, not subject to reciprocal compensation. We rejected that view, determining that a call to an ISP, like a call to a radio call-in program or any other large volume call recipient, was a local call,¹⁸ billed at local rates, and therefore subject to reciprocal compensation. We went on to reject various other arguments, based on cost characteristics or network congestion, for treating calls to ISPs differently from other calls, and we simply closed the proceeding.¹⁹

The issue arose again in the contest of chatlines. In an order directed primarily to chatline blocking, we noted the existence of compensation arrangements under which carriers shared their reciprocal compensation revenues with information providers (IPs). We inferred on that basis that the reciprocal compensation revenues exceeded the termination costs they were supposed to cover, and we cited as well the traffic imbalances already noted. We invited carriers to file cost and rate information that might warrant a different compensation system for the calling at issue, though we noted we would examine only tariffed rates and would leave existing interconnection agreements intact.²⁰

¹⁸ As noted, the FCC has recently taken a different view; its decision is discussed below.

¹⁹ Case 97-C-1275, Reciprocal Compensation Related to Internet Traffic, Order Closing Proceeding (issued March 19, 1998).

²⁰ Case 98-C-1273 et al., Blocking Obligations for Chatline Services (Chatline Proceeding), Order Directing Carriers to File Tariffs for Chatline Services and Related Actions (issued February 4, 1999).

Bell Atlantic-New York responded to that invitation and petitioned for a reopening of the ISP Case, reconsideration of the decision reached there, and interim relief. After considering responsive comments and the recent FCC action, we found a basis for reexamining "whether existing reciprocal compensation arrangements are affected by the termination of large-volume call termination traffic to single customers."²¹ We declined to reopen the ISP case; denied interim relief as, in effect, a distraction from the more important process of setting permanent rates; and instituted this proceeding for that purpose, directing that it be conducted on an expedited basis.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a prehearing conference on April 21, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Joel Linsider issued a ruling defining the scope of the proceeding and adopting procedures and a schedule for the hearings.²² Among other things, he identified various issues properly within the proceeding (including the relationship between the rates that may be set here and those included in interconnection agreements), and he noted that costing of the components of the various network configurations had been or will be handled in the First or Second Network Element Proceeding and should not be repeated or anticipated here. He reserved judgment on whether the burden of proof rested entirely on the ILECs, in the traditional manner, or was shared with CLECs; but he asked all parties, CLECs included, to submit threshold testimony describing the facilities they use to serve ISPs and chatlines and setting forth specified data on their traffic patterns.²³

²¹ Instituting Order, p. 3.

²² Case 99-C-0529, Ruling on Procedure and Schedule (issued April 27, 1999).

²³ The Judge later ruled that parties not submitting threshold testimony would not be permitted to submit later rounds of testimony or to cross-examine, though they would be

Numerous parties submitted testimony; they are identified (by full name and short description used in this opinion) in Appendix B. Hearings before Judge Linsider were held in Albany on June 21-22, 1999; cross-examination was waived as to all witnesses except those sponsored by Bell Atlantic-New York and Frontier. The record comprises 793 pages of stenographic transcript and 64 exhibits; portions of that record have been designated as proprietary.²⁴

Briefs and reply briefs were invited; parties submitting them also are identified in Appendix B. Following the conclusion of the hearings, parties were asked, in a letter from Dan Martin of the Office of Communications dated June 24, 1999, to include with their briefs their replies to a series of questions; several parties responded to those questions instead of submitting briefs.

OVERVIEW OF PARTIES'
POSITIONS AND THIS OPINION

The ILECs (primarily Bell Atlantic-New York and Frontier) and CPB propose substantial changes to the existing reciprocal compensation arrangements. Among the CLECs, Time Warner proposes a substantial change, and MCIW offers a modest change as a less favored alternative to maintenance of the status quo. All other CLECs would maintain the status quo, though they differ in their arguments for doing so.

Putting the matter in its most general terms, Bell Atlantic-New York begins its brief by announcing "the current reciprocal compensation regime is broken, and needs to be fixed," and Frontier refers to the ILECs' "hemorrhage of cash

permitted to file briefs. He also clarified that parties who, by their nature, had no threshold data to submit (such as industry organizations and the State Consumer Protection Board) were not subject to this requirement. Case 99-C-0529, Ruling Concerning Parties Not Filing Threshold Testimony (issued May 20, 1999).

²⁴ Consistent with usual practice, this material has been designated proprietary on a provisional basis. The Judge's ruling determining the final status of each item is pending.

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in the form of reciprocal compensation."²⁵ In stark contrast, CTSI et al. state unequivocally that "this proceeding is about [Bell Atlantic-New York's] great distaste for paying its competitors to provide termination services for local telecommunications traffic initiated by [Bell Atlantic-New York's] customers"²⁶; and Global NAPs sees this case as the latest battle in the ILECs' ongoing war to frustrate the competitive evolution contemplated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. With "resale moribund" and "[unbundled network element]/collocation hobbled," Global NAPs charges, Bell Atlantic-New York is now

seeking protection from the meager interconnection-based competition that has thus far developed. Bell Atlantic[-New York] complains that its competitors are niche-based, ignore the residential market, and are "abusing" the system by exercising their rights under the [1996] Act and expecting the ILECs to comply with their duties. As Bell Atlantic[-New York] sees it, this outrageous behavior must be ended, and quickly, by jiggering the rules to eliminate even the niche competition that has been able to develop. This, of course, is anticompetitive nonsense.²⁷

²⁵ Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 1; Frontier's Initial Brief, p. 1.

²⁶ CTSI et al.'s Initial Brief, p. 1.

²⁷ Global NAPs' Reply Brief, pp. 3-4.

As is apparent, Time Warner is not far off the mark when it refers, in its reply brief, to the heavily rhetorical nature of the initial briefs.²⁸

For purposes of this overview, parties are grouped on the basis of whether they propose changes (even modest changes as a less favored alternative) or fully endorse the status quo.

Parties Proposing Changes

Bell Atlantic-New York contends that CLECs serving a preponderance of customers with convergent traffic flows avoid many of the costs that are incurred by full-service providers (CLECs and ILECs alike) and therefore should not receive reciprocal compensation at rates that reflect those costs. Providing such above-cost compensation to CLECs, in its view, requires ILECs to finance their competitors; beyond that, it encourages CLECs to seek out niche markets rather than becoming full-service providers, thereby harming customers by denying them the benefits of true competition, and creates disincentives to introducing more efficient arrangements for Internet access.

Bell Atlantic New York offers four proposed remedies:

remove from intercarrier compensation rates all costs associated with vertical switching features²⁹

deny a CLEC reciprocal compensation at tandem (Meet Point B) rates for the delivery of convergent traffic if the CLEC does not offer

²⁸ This is not to say, as Time Warner goes on to worry, that "the Commission has been left to its own devices to reconcile a difficult and often conflicting record, providing a poor basis upon which to reach a reasoned decision." Time Warner's Reply Brief, p. 1. The results we have reached are reasonable and are supported by substantial evidence.

²⁹ "Vertical" features are all switching functions other than those used in the simple routing and delivery of traffic.

a tandem interconnection option

deny all reciprocal compensation for the delivery of Internet-bound traffic; or, if compensation is provided, limit it to "direct variable cost"³⁰

require all local exchange carriers to provide "geographically relevant interconnection points" (GRIPs) when they assign customers numbers outside the rate centers in which the customers are located.³¹

Frontier describes what it considers to be the current regime's disastrous effects on ILECs and undesirable results for society as a whole. It goes on to propose that Internet traffic be excluded from reciprocal compensation and treated on a bill-and-keep basis, as the Commission is legally permitted to do. Termination of non-Internet convergent traffic should be compensated on the basis of the CLEC's own costs rather than the ILEC's, which Frontier believes to be legally permissible; if the ILEC's costs are to be used, they should be limited to the ILEC's "tandem switching cost, not [including] its local switching and termination costs."³²

³⁰ Direct variable cost excludes (in addition to vertical features) depreciation, return, and any allocation of joint and common costs.

³¹ Users, such as ISPs, may request such service in order to establish a presence outside their geographic areas, making it possible for their own customers to call them without incurring toll charges.

³² Frontier's Initial Brief, p. 10. As noted, Frontier uses "tandem costs" to refer to the lower of the alternatives.

Time Warner stresses the variation among CLECs with respect to business plans, network configuration, and traffic patterns. Asserting that its own traffic imbalance is less extreme and less relevant than that of some other CLECs, it argues that what it terms "responsible CLECs"³³ design their networks to carry originating as well as terminating traffic and build those networks to serve a broad range of customers.

In its view, the optimal reciprocal compensation rate is a negotiated blended rate (such as those in Time Warner's own interconnection agreements) falling between the ILEC's tandem and end-office rate; the blend takes account of both carriers' network design, customer types, and traffic patterns. Time Warner urges us to avoid disturbing blended rate arrangements; but where these arrangements are inappropriate (because the CLEC does not build out its network and serve two-way traffic), it would establish a sliding scale framework that ties the reciprocal compensation rate to the CLEC's traffic patterns and number of interconnection points.

MCIW favors maintenance of the status quo and denies that traffic patterns are a proper indicator of costs. It suggests, however, that an extreme traffic imbalance (an incoming to outgoing ratio of 100:1 or more) could trigger an audit of the CLEC's network configuration to determine whether it in fact met the functional equivalence test for receiving reciprocal compensation at the tandem rather than the end-office rate.

CPB regards traffic patterns as a fair indicator of functional equivalence (or its absence) and suggests a below-tandem rate where the incoming to outgoing ratio is 5:1 or more. But it would apply that remedy only after it had been shown that the local market was, in fact, open to competition, to avoid the risk that the CLEC's traffic pattern (or, more fundamentally, its serving only the convergent traffic niche market) may have been caused by the ILEC's failure to open the

³³ Time Warner's Initial Brief, p. 4.

market in a manner that permits CLECs to become full-service providers.

Parties Favoring the Status Quo

CLECs other than those identified in the foregoing section generally urge maintenance of the status quo, offering a variety of arguments in its support. They contend, among other things, that no showing has been made of pertinent differences between how traffic is handled by ILECs and by CLECs, and that traffic imbalances say nothing about a carrier's costs or about whether a CLEC's network is functionally equivalent to an ILEC's. Indeed, some say, reciprocal compensation contemplates a traffic imbalance; and ILECs, which initially sought reciprocal compensation rather than bill-and-keep because they thought the imbalance would favor them, should not be heard to change their position simply because the imbalance in fact turned out to work against them. They note that ILECs benefit, through avoided costs, when CLECs deliver calls; and they warn against denying CLECs the opportunity to recover their costs and, where those costs are, in fact, less than the CLEC's, to enjoy the benefits of their innovations and efficiencies.

Some CLECs warn against depriving carriers of legitimate opportunities to pursue niche markets as a means of entry or growth, and some suggest that barriers to broader entry leave them no choice but to seek out convergent traffic. They note in particular the unfairness that would result from taking away those opportunities after they had acted in reliance on them. Some CLECs deny that traffic imbalances imply any abuse of the system; others, as already noted, distance themselves from putative abusers, and urge that any remedy be properly targeted.

With regard to non-Internet traffic, some CLECs contend any change from the existing arrangements would violate applicable legal constraints, including the FCC's commitments to functional equivalence as the measure of

whether the tandem rate should be allowed and to TELRIC as the measure of costs. With regard to Internet traffic, CLECs recognize the FCC ISP Ruling has provided the states more discretion (though some raise legal concerns about deaveraging by type of customer) but urge maintenance of the status quo on policy grounds.

Finally, CLECs object to specific aspects of the various proposals for change, raising both legal and policy issues.

The Attorney General, whose office filed only a reply brief, asks us to "consider[,] as [our] first order of concern, how or if any . . . changes [to the existing reciprocal compensation regime] would adversely affect availability of affordable internet access for New York consumers." He therefore urges us to "move with extreme caution" in considering whether to make any such changes.³⁴

This Opinion

We begin with the question of burden of proof, unusual in this case because the rates at issue are the CLECs' but the costs on which they are based are the ILECs'. We then consider the parties' views on the broad question of whether the existing system is broken and in need of repair. We next present, one by one, the specific proposals for change and the arguments for and against them. Finally, we evaluate the record and describe the remedies we are adopting.

In view of the large number of CLECs filing briefs, it is not surprising that many cover the same ground and present the same arguments. We present the pertinent arguments that have been offered, but we make no attempt to summarize each individual brief or to attribute each argument to each party making it.

BURDEN OF PROOF

³⁴ Attorney General's Reply Brief, p. 3.

The issue of burden of proof arose at the prehearing conference, where the CLECs generally saw the burden as resting with the ILECs, as in a traditional rate case, while the ILECs saw the burden as shared. In his ensuing ruling, the Administrative Law Judge declined to resolve conclusively questions that might require further briefing but, as already discussed, required the CLECs to provide threshold information.³⁵

In its brief, Bell Atlantic-New York contends that the rates at issue here are the CLECs' and that, accordingly, they bear the burden of proof, even with respect to proposals made by ILECs. It cites the Public Service Law's (PSL's) provision that

at any hearing involving a change or a proposed change of rates, the burden of proof to show that the change or proposed change if proposed by the utility, or that the existing rate, if it is proposed to reduce the rate, is just and reasonable shall be upon the utility.³⁶

It adds that it makes sense for the CLEC to bear the burden of proof inasmuch as it has the best information related to its rates, including how it serves its customers and how it realizes efficiencies by specializing in convergent traffic. Asserting that the CLECs have offered no analysis in support of their slogan that "a minute is a minute," i.e., that all types of traffic impose the same switching and transport costs, Bell Atlantic-New York contends that the proposition must be rejected on burden of proof grounds alone. Frontier,

³⁵ Case 99-C-0529, Ruling on Procedure and Schedule (issued April 27, 1999), p. 3.

³⁶ PSL '92(2)(f). Bell Atlantic-New York notes that in 1921, the statute was amended to impose on the utility the burden of proof with respect to all proposed rate changes, not merely rate increases proposed by the utility itself. It observes as well that CLECs come within the statute's definition of a utility.

meanwhile, sees the CLECs' failure to provide information on their actual costs as warranting an inference that those costs are over-recovered by reciprocal compensation rates based on the ILEC's TELRIC.

In response, CTSI et al. argue that the purpose of the proceeding is not necessarily to reduce rates but, quoting from the Instituting Order, "to reexamine whether existing reciprocal compensation rates are affected" by convergent traffic. The first step in that reexamination is to determine whether there are differences in network costs that warrant a different rate, and the burden of that showing is on Bell Atlantic-New York, as the party that instituted the proceeding and that advocates a change in the existing regulatory regime.

The CLECs' own costs, they continue, are not at issue, given that the ILECs's costs are used as a proxy. CTSI et al. add that Bell Atlantic-New York has not borne its burden, in view of, among other things, the CLECs' "uncontroverted evidence that they utilize the same facilities to terminate all types of traffic and that their costs to terminate traffic are the same regardless of the nature of their traffic."³⁷

The PSL's imposition of the burden of proof on the utility defending its existing rate or proposing a higher one does not resolve the matter here, for it contemplates a very different kind of proceeding, in which the utility's costs, concerning which it has by far the greatest access to pertinent information, come under scrutiny in an attempt to determine their reasonableness and prudence. Here, in contrast, the configurations of the CLECs' systems are pertinent, which is why the CLECs were directed to provide system descriptions, but the reasonableness of the actual costs incurred by CLECs in constructing their networks are not at issue. Moreover, what is at issue is less the CLECs' rates than the proper way to understand and apply the regulatory structure pursuant to which those rates are set. The parties

³⁷ CTSI et al.'s Reply Brief, p. 15.

advocating changes (the ILECs, Time Warner, and CPB) have, at a minimum, the burden of going forward and making at least a prima facie case that change is needed and, even more, that their specific proposals represent reasonable responses to problems that have been identified. And, in the face of substantive responses to their prima facie cases, they face a substantial burden of persuasion as well.³⁸

When all is said and done, however, this case should not be decided on the basis of burden of proof. In a traditional rate case, if a consumer group goes forward with a prima facie showing that forecast tree-trimming expense, for example, should be reduced, the utility's burden of proof means it must respond persuasively to that showing or risk suffering a reduction in its allowance for that item. Here, in contrast, the issue is one of broader policy development and application, and we have the authority to range further afield to craft a just and reasonable result, based on substantial evidence in the record but less tied to burden of proof considerations than a traditional rate case decision might have been.

THE ALLEGED NEED FOR RELIEF

The ILECs' Claims³⁹

Frontier sums up the ILECs' view of the situation as follows:

The battle lines in this proceeding are well-drawn. The incumbents are experiencing a hemorrhage of cash in the

³⁸ As added warrant for imposing the burden of proof on the parties proposing changes, CTSI et al. cite State Administrative Procedure Act (SAPA) '306, which provides that the burden of proof shall be on the party who initiated the proceeding. That provision is not pertinent here, however, since this is not an adjudicatory proceeding subject to Article 3 of SAPA.

³⁹ These presentations of parties' positions include, on occasion, responsive points as well.

form of reciprocal compensation, and the more they pay in reciprocal compensation, the more they have to invest in facilities to carry the traffic to their competitors in order to pay even more. The competitors are earning tremendous profits on this traffic, because they charge rates all out of proportion to their actual costs. The customers who are creating all this incoming traffic are also sharing in the gravy train, and some are receiving free service or even being paid to take service merely because they generate large amounts of incoming traffic. A whole industry is growing up to feed on the revenue stream from the incumbents, and the focus of local exchange competition is shifting to the attraction of one-way incoming service.⁴⁰

Frontier goes on to compare the incentives provided to CLECs by reciprocal compensation arrangements to those offered to qualifying energy producing facilities by the federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and New York's "Six Cent Law," both of which, it suggests, encourage the production of otherwise uneconomic products. Frontier warns of disastrous impacts on ILECs and alleges adverse effects on society in general. These include the invention of services such as chatlines, which, Frontier says, we found were not necessarily beneficial; the creation of disincentives to the provision by CLECs of service to flat-rate residential customers, whose monthly payments to their LEC will likely just exceed the LECs reciprocal compensation payments on their account; and the need for uneconomical investments on the part of the ILEC to carry traffic originated by their flat rate customers for delivery to CLECs' customers.

Frontier contends further that the existing arrangements encourage CLECs to charge discriminatory rates to benefit convergent customers and to invest in switches that otherwise would not be economic; it cites a CLEC that has installed two switches, one a tandem and the other a local

⁴⁰ Frontier's Initial Brief, p. 1 (footnote omitted).

exchange switch, alongside its voice mail platform in Rochester "in an attempt to charge reciprocal compensation for incoming traffic and to obtain the lion's share of access revenues for incoming toll calls."⁴¹ Frontier disputes the premise that society benefits from CLECs reducing rates to ISPs, contending that any such benefit is simply a poorly thought through, unnecessary, and anti-competitive subsidy.

Relief from this situation is warranted, Frontier continues, because reciprocal compensation makes sense only where, in its absence, the originating LEC would receive compensation for the call and the terminating LEC would not, and where the costs borne by both LECs are nearly equal. Internet traffic, it argues, does not meet these conditions, inasmuch as most of it originates from flat rate residential subscribers who pay no additional charges for their calls to ISPs. Meanwhile, even in the absence of reciprocal compensation, the CLEC receives incremental revenues from its ISP customer, while the ILEC is required not only to pay reciprocal compensation but to incur substantial expenses for the Internet traffic it carries.⁴² (CPB responds that these costs, attributable to the demands imposed by Frontier's own customers, are irrelevant to the proper level of reciprocal compensation.)

Bell Atlantic-New York presents similar arguments. It cites statements, drawn from CLEC web sites and submitted in Bell Atlantic-New York's comments in the Chatline Proceeding, to the effect that many CLECs seek customers with convergent traffic "simply for the purpose of collecting

⁴¹ Frontier's Initial Brief, p. 4, n. 11.

⁴² Frontier observes that the party actually responsible for the costs is the ISP, which charges its end users for its services and, in some situations, receives from the CLEC a portion of the reciprocal compensation revenues received by the CLEC on its account. Frontier suggests that ISPs should, in fact, be regarded as carriers who, rather than receiving compensation from ILECs, should be obligated to pay carrier access charges.

intercarrier compensation payments from incumbent LECs.

Indeed, in many cases intercarrier compensation has become the principal line of business for such carriers."⁴³ Noting that during the first quarter of 1999, the aggregate measured traffic flow from Bell Atlantic-New York to CLECs was more than ten times greater than the flow in the reverse direction,⁴⁴ Bell Atlantic-New York contends that the market is being shaped by regulation, that ILECs are being forced to finance their competitors, and that customers are injured because CLECs are discouraged from becoming the kind of full service providers who will bring the benefits of true competition.

Bell Atlantic-New York goes on to describe the FCC's symmetry and functional equivalence principles for reciprocal compensation, and it argues that though the FCC ISP Ruling permits states to apply those requirements to ISP traffic, it does not require them to. It points as well to the Framework Order and urges us to reaffirm and apply the Framework Order's principles of universal service (which Bell Atlantic-New York sees as favoring "intercarrier compensation rules that provided incentives for provision of a broad range of services to a wide variety of customers"⁴⁵); symmetry (meaning that the ILEC's rate levels should apply to the CLEC as well, the question being which rate applies under which circumstances); functional equivalence, defined as "the ability to terminate calls to all customers served by a carrier's unique, stand alone network by delivery to a single point of interconnection"⁴⁶); and efficient interconnection (requiring, as a further condition of charging tandem rates, that CLECs "provide the incumbent appropriate interconnection options

⁴³ Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 1.

⁴⁴ Tr. 96, 165-166.

⁴⁵ Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 15.

⁴⁶ Framework Order, p. 6, n. 1, cited at Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 16, n. 40.

within their network that would allow the incumbent access to more efficient connections"⁴⁷). Bell Atlantic-New York adds that the symmetry principle, as we and the FCC have adopted it, makes actual CLEC costs irrelevant.

As discussed in more detail in connection with its specific proposals, Bell Atlantic-New York maintains that the termination of convergent traffic enjoys efficiencies that are unavailable when more broadly dispersed traffic is terminated. The CLECs respond that these claims are unsubstantiated.

The CLECs' Positions

Although the CLECs' briefs vary in their treatment of the issues, several common themes may be identified. This section is organized around those themes.

1. The Significance of Carrying Convergent Traffic

AT&T, among others, argues that traffic imbalances say nothing about the proper level of reciprocal compensation and that reciprocal compensation, in fact, contemplates traffic imbalances, without which the simpler bill-and-keep system could have been adopted. It contends as well that Bell Atlantic-New York overlooks other traffic imbalances that run in its favor, such as its termination of 2.7 times as many minutes of wireless traffic as CLECs terminate for it. Mid-Hudson/Northland and MCI, among others, note that it was the ILECs that, over the CLECs' objection, favored creation of the reciprocal compensation mechanism; these parties urge that the ILECs be required to accept the consequences of their tactics and not be bailed out now that their bet has gone sour.

Looking to the genesis of the traffic imbalance rather than its implications, several CLECs, such as CTSI et al., attribute the tendency of some CLECs to seek convergent traffic customers to Bell Atlantic-New York's continued

⁴⁷ Framework Order, p. 6, cited at Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 16.

imposition of barriers to more broad-based market entry.

CTSI et al. assert that

If Bell Atlantic effectively denies access to loops, and it is cost-prohibitive for the entrant to deploy them, serving customers that require fewer loops is clearly rational business behavior. If Bell Atlantic provides woefully inadequate operations support systems that make large-scale ordering and provisioning completely unreliable, providing services that are less dependent on effective OSS interfaces is also logical. If Bell Atlantic neglects a market segment by failing to offer collocation arrangements that customers in that market segment want, providing those collocation arrangements is one way to compete. And if Bell Atlantic makes it extremely difficult to transition a customer from Bell Atlantic to a CLEC, targeting customers that are establishing businesses is also logical. In all of these cases, ISPs are excellent customers for CLECs.⁴⁸

CPB responds that reciprocal compensation rates should be cost-based regardless of who pays whom.

Some CLECs broaden this point, asserting that pursuing niche markets is not merely a reaction to barriers erected by ILECs but is a proper strategy for entering the market, either enroute to becoming a full-service provider or as an inherently reasonable business plan in itself. Mid-Hudson/Northland, TRA, and others urge us to avoid making changes that would undermine the expectations of small, innovative carriers who had relied in good faith on the existing regulatory structure to provide them revenue streams from niche markets--and especially not to do so in order to protect ILEC monopolists from the consequences of their own mistakes in favoring reciprocal compensation. (Bell Atlantic-New York challenges the premise of reliance, asserting that CLECs recognized the possibility that the existing rules might

⁴⁸ CTSI et al.'s Initial Brief, pp. 10-11.

change; for that reason, among others, it sees no need for a transition period before new arrangements are introduced.)

Mid-Hudson/Northland add that the sharing by CLECs of revenues with ISP customers (which Bell Atlantic-New York cites as evidence that reciprocal compensation revenues that were improperly above cost) is nothing more than the sharing of cost savings with end user customers, in a manner conceptually the same as an ILEC's attracting a prospective customer with an individual case basis pricing arrangement substantially below the tariffed price. Since the beneficiaries of the practice are end users, Mid-Hudson/Northland suggest, the practice should be encouraged, not discouraged.⁴⁹

Reinforcing the propriety of pursuing of niche markets, MCIW, the Cable Association, and others assert that Bell Atlantic-New York itself does so, citing its recent introduction of Internet Protocol Routing Service (IPRS) to attract ISP customers. The Cable Association notes that the service was introduced following our denial of Bell Atlantic-New York's request for immediate relief from reciprocal compensation obligations relating to ISP-bound traffic; and it suggests that granting the request, which the Cable Association characterizes as one for protection from competitive forces, would have vitiated Bell Atlantic-New York's incentive to introduce the new service. In response, Bell Atlantic-New York denies that IPRS was a reaction to our decision, arguing it could never have been planned and introduced that quickly. More broadly, it objects to the premise that it should be encouraged to compete to retain its customers by being required to subsidize its competitors.

In contrast to the CLECs who emphasize the propriety of pursuing niche markets, others point to the distinctions among CLECs, some of which are, or aspire to be, full service providers. They urge us to do nothing in this proceeding that

⁴⁹ Mid-Hudson/Northland's Initial Brief, p. 17.

would interfere with their ability to function in that capacity. Without suggesting that a focus on ISP or convergent traffic is inherently abusive, they argue that CLECs that may be found to be abusing the existing regulatory structure should be pursued separately, in a manner that does not protect the ILECs from competition by full service, facilities-based providers. CTSI et al., for example, cite testimony that they have not limited themselves to high volume convergent traffic customers, and they object to a one-size-fits-all approach.⁵⁰

The point is emphasized by Time Warner and Lightpath. Lightpath contends that it serves a diverse customer base and points to the blended reciprocal compensation rate in its interconnection agreement with Bell Atlantic-New York, which permits it to receive reciprocal compensation based on end-office rates for traffic terminated via end-office trunks and on tandem rates for traffic terminated via tandem trunks.⁵¹ It charges that Bell Atlantic-New York's effort to seek broad changes in existing reciprocal compensation arrangements rather than pursuing the few CLECs who allegedly abuse the system represents an effort to use the regulatory system to undermine competitive carriers in the one area where they have succeeded in eroding Bell Atlantic-New York's market share.⁵² It asks us "to maintain the status quo--especially with respect to full-service, facilities-based carriers. . . ." ⁵³

Time Warner, meanwhile, urges recognition of the variation in CLECs' business plans and operating networks, asserting that "responsible CLECs, those that design their networks and their points of interconnection . . . based on

⁵⁰ CTSI et al.'s Initial Brief, p. 21.

⁵¹ Lightpath's Initial Brief, p. 16.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 5-6. The Cable Association argues to similar effect. Cable Association's Initial Brief, p. 4.

⁵³ Lightpath's Reply Brief, p. 3.

sound engineering principles for the flow of both originating and terminating traffic, have built their networks to serve a broad range of local telephone customers."⁵⁴ It adds that "the ILECs have offered no evidence to dispute the fact that responsible CLECs have built out, and continue to augment, their networks as necessary to handle actual and anticipated two-way traffic volumes among providers."⁵⁵ Recognizing this degree of variation among CLECs, and attempting to provide incentives for CLECs to build out their networks, Time Warner offers its own proposed modification, described in detail below, to the existing reciprocal compensation scheme.

Bell Atlantic-New York responds that there is no basis for distinguishing among CLECs in this way and that its proposals are intended not to punish vice or reward virtue but only to reflect the fact that it costs less to deliver convergent traffic than to deliver traffic to numerous, widely dispersed customers. It therefore would apply its proposals to the convergent traffic carried by FSPs as well as to niche players.

⁵⁴ Time Warner's Initial Brief, p. 4, footnotes omitted.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

2. Relationship between
Traffic Ratios and Costs

Many CLECs assert that the ILECs have shown no relationship between the type of traffic carried and the costs incurred to terminate it; they insist that "a minute is a minute," regardless of the type of traffic being carried.⁵⁶ CompTel, for example, cites Bell Atlantic-New York's witness's confirmation that it uses the same network facilities for all types of traffic, and e-Spire/Intermedia note the witness's statement that network components are not related to traffic imbalances.⁵⁷ Bell Atlantic-New York disputes these characterizations of its witness's testimony, contending, among other things, that the use of similar facilities, referred to by the witness, does not mean the facilities are identical.⁵⁸

MCIW similarly contends that Bell Atlantic-New York failed to show that CLECs' costs are lower than ILECs' because they provide service to convergent customers; it cites its own witness's statement that

virtually all of the CLECs in this case provided information that, in aggregate, demonstrates that ISP traffic is being routed through the same interconnection, transport, and circuit switching equipment that all other traffic is being routed over. [Bell Atlantic-New York] provided similar testimony stating that, to the extent that it could identify ISPs separately from other end users, calls to those ISPs are also being routed through the same interconnection, transport, and switching equipment and facilities as any other type of end user call.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ TRA's Initial Brief, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁷ CompTel's Initial Brief, p. 4, citing Tr. 296, 307, 308; e-Spire/Intermedia's Initial Brief, pp. 6-7, citing Tr. 297-298.

⁵⁸ Bell Atlantic-New York's Reply Brief, p. 15, n. 30.

⁵⁹ Tr. 722, cited in MCIW's Initial Brief, p. 4.

CTSI et al. cite in particular what they characterize as Bell Atlantic-New York's testimony that the length of the loop has nothing to do with the carrier's terminating costs.⁶⁰

Lightpath, apparently distinguishing full-service CLECs from others, states that "despite extensive testimony filed by both incumbent and competitive carriers, no evidence has been presented to demonstrate that terminating large volumes of calls to single customers is more cost effective for full service, facilities-based providers than terminating other types of traffic."⁶¹

Several CLECs stress the centrality of the functional equivalence determination in deciding whether the rate should be set at the tandem or end-office level or at some point in between. AT&T notes our statement in the Framework Order that functional equivalence does not depend on a CLEC's network architecture as long as the CLEC can terminate calls to all customers served by its network through a single point of interconnection. Disputing Bell Atlantic-New York's suggestion that CLECs' use of a single-switch network architecture may provide them efficiencies and lower costs that would warrant withholding reciprocal compensation at tandem rates, AT&T explains that a CLEC must use the single-switch network architecture in the early stages of competition until it gains volumes that would warrant the installation of additional end-office and tandem switches.⁶² CompTel notes the FCC's determination that a CLEC is entitled to a tandem rate in cases where its switch serves a geographic area comparable to that served by the ILECs tandem switch. MCIW see the functional equivalence doctrine as permitting a state commission to determine whether a particular CLEC is entitled to the tandem rate on the basis of "economically

⁶⁰ Tr. 178, cited in CTSI et al.'s Initial Brief, pp. 8-9.

⁶¹ Lightpath's Initial Brief, p. 2.

⁶² AT&T's Initial Brief, p. 8.

relevant considerations, mainly the geographic coverage that the CLEC's switch supports"⁶³ instead of on the basis of such irrelevant considerations as traffic ratios. Lightpath argues that its system meets both the FCC's geographic area standard and our single point of interconnection standard and that its consequent tandem functionality is not vitiated by the fact that it serves some convergent customers. It asserts that

once a CLEC has made the necessary investment to build out a full facilities-based network that meets the commissions' [i.e., FCC's and PSC's] definitions of tandem functionality, it is entitled to be compensated for its costs using tandem switching as a proxy. . . Thus, a CLEC's right to receive tandem termination rates is based on the overall functionality of the switch with respect to calls and all customers served by the CLEC's switch, and not on the characteristics of a particular call or type of traffic.⁶⁴

In response, CPB maintains that tandem functionality is not needed to terminate calls to a small number of large-volume customers and that such customers can be served using high-capacity facilities having a lower cost-per-minute than the low-capacity facilities used to serve a large number of widely dispersed customers. It urges us to reflect these cost differences in the reciprocal compensation rates applicable to traffic terminated to large-volume customers. Frontier asserts that these differences mean that a lower compensation rate for this type of traffic would be consistent with the federal requirements, and it points to Time Warner's recognition of cost differences between convergent and other traffic.

⁶³ MCIW's Initial Brief, p. 5.

⁶⁴ Lightpath's Initial Brief, pp. 14-15 (emphasis in original).

3. Other Cost-Related Issues

Several CLECs argue that the cost calculus should recognize the fact ILECs avoid costs when CLECs terminate traffic that they originate. AT&T states, for example, that

[Bell Atlantic-New York's] own TELRIC costs form the basis for the existing rates. If [Bell Atlantic-New York] terminates less in-bound ISP traffic because such traffic is terminated instead by CLECs, [Bell Atlantic-New York] saved the costs of delivering such traffic. As long as such costs are appropriately calculated, [Bell Atlantic-New York] suffers no loss and cannot complain that an "imbalance" in traffic or payments represents a basis for altering rates.⁶⁵

TRA adds that the ILEC's retail rates recover termination costs and that allowing an ILEC to avoid responsibility for those costs, by delivering traffic to a CLEC for termination without paying full compensation, would unjustly enrich the ILEC and represent "a classic monopoly abuse of the ILEC's customers."⁶⁶

Some CLEC's respond to Bell Atlantic-New York's concern that its reciprocal compensation payments exceed the revenues it receives from end-users that place calls to ISPs.

CTSI et al., for example, note that any averaged rate structure contemplates customers that generate more costs than revenues being offset by others that generate more revenues than costs; that if Bell Atlantic-New York's residential retail rate is inadequate, it should be examined elsewhere; that dial-up access to the Internet generates other sources of revenues for an ILEC, such as additional lines and vertical features; and that the existence of Bell Atlantic-New York's own ISP (Bell Atlantic.net) suggests that its end-user rate structure supports dial-up access to ISPs, for if it did not,

⁶⁵ AT&T's Initial Brief, p. 7.

⁶⁶ TRA's Initial Brief, pp. 4-5.

its provision of a competitive ISP service would be unlawfully subsidized by its monopoly ratepayers.⁶⁷ Lightpath argues that any mismatch between revenues from calls with long holding times and the costs of carrying those calls should not be solved through adjustments to reciprocal compensation; to do so, it says, would force CLECs to subsidize calls with long holding times originated by ILECs.

Finally, several CLECs, including Global NAPs, assert that even if it made more sense to recover ISP termination costs through carrier access charges (on the premise that ISPs are analogous to carriers rather than final destinations for traffic), doing so is precluded. The only way to recover those costs, accordingly, is through reciprocal compensation.

4. Legal and Procedural Points

Lightpath, among others, contends that the existing reciprocal compensation framework is legally binding for local (i.e., for purposes of this case, non-ISP) traffic, pointing to the doctrine of functional equivalence as determinative. Bell Atlantic-New York does not really dispute that point, though it takes a very different view of what "functional equivalence" entails. CTSI et al. cite the provision of the FCC's rules that prohibit an ILEC from charging a CLEC element rates that "vary on the basis of the class of customers served by the requesting carrier, or on the type of service that the requesting carrier purchasing such elements uses them to provide."⁶⁸ Bell Atlantic-New York responds that it is proposing to distinguish among types of traffic, not types of customer,⁶⁹ and that such distinctions are clearly permitted, as evidenced by the authorization to apply different rates to

⁶⁷ CTSI et al.'s Initial Brief, pp. 25-26.

⁶⁸ 47 C.F.R. '51.503(c).

⁶⁹ The exception is for ISP customers, no longer subject to the FCC's rule.

tandem-routed and end-office-routed traffic.

In addition, Lightpath, CTSI et al., and others assert that regardless of what may otherwise be decided in this case, existing interconnection agreements should prevail at least until the ends of their terms.

Bell Atlantic-New York responds that its proposals should be incorporated into existing agreements only to the extent those agreements, by their own terms, require or allow that incorporation. The proposals, in its view, should guide interconnection negotiations, be incorporated in LEC tariffs, and be applied in resolving disputes, but should not alter existing agreements.

On a more specific matter, Bell Atlantic-New York observed in its initial brief that "agreements already in force should be interpreted in accordance with normal principles of contract interpretation."⁷⁰ Citing its comments in the Chatline Proceeding, it went on to assert that those agreements, properly interpreted, would not provide for inter-carrier compensation for Internet traffic, presumably because such traffic does not "terminate" on the receiving carrier's network (consistent with the FCC's finding in its ISP Ruling).

In its reply brief, Lightpath strongly disputes that reading, insisting its agreement with Bell Atlantic-New York was intended to include Internet traffic, and it asks us to clarify that Bell Atlantic-New York must continue to honor its contractual agreements until they expire.⁷¹

Positions of State Agencies

1. CPB

CPB attributes traffic imbalances to multiple factors: like the CLECs, it sees the imbalances as resulting from the ILECs' failure to open markets adequately and from

⁷⁰ Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 5.

⁷¹ This specific issue, along with others, is resolved below, in the "Discussion and Conclusions" section.

the CLECs' own logical business plans; but, like the ILECs, it also assigns a role to the incentives provided by the reciprocal compensation structure. It suggests that excessive reciprocal compensation rates artificially discourage competition for customers that originate telephone calls, such as residential and small business customers, and it therefore sees a need to adjust the existing system while still providing compensation for all call termination. (Its proposal is described in detail below.) To ensure, however, that the traffic imbalances that are dealt with by its proposal do not result from the ILECs' failure to open their markets to CLECs, it would defer application of its remedy until the ILECs' local market is fully open to competition.⁷²

In response, Bell Atlantic-New York argues that if the market is not yet fully open (a premise it rejects) continuing to make niche markets artificially attractive will work against the development of local competition, not in favor of it. And even if its actions prevented CLECs from maturing to tandem functionality (another premise it rejects), that would be no reason to provide reciprocal compensation at above-cost levels. AT&T, citing CPB's statement that "one reason for the current imbalance in the exchange of traffic between ILECs and CLECs is that ILECs' local markets are not yet open to competition," asserts that "as recognized by the CPB, the real reason for the current imbalance in traffic flows is that [Bell Atlantic-New York] has not yet opened the local market to broad based competition."⁷³

⁷² CPB's Initial Brief, p. 19.

⁷³ Id.; AT&T's Reply Brief, p. 8 (emphasis supplied in both quotations).

2. The Attorney General

As noted, the Attorney General emphasizes the need to avoid any steps that would impede widely available Internet access.

SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

Bell Atlantic-New York's Proposals

1. Exclusion of Vertical Feature Costs

Bell Atlantic-New York proposes to exclude from the Phase 1 switching costs on the basis of which reciprocal compensation rates are set all costs associated with "vertical features," such as call waiting, which are not used in the simple routing and delivery of traffic. Acknowledging that the amount to be excluded cannot be determined on the basis of the record in Phase 1 of the First Network Elements Proceeding, it suggests a reduction of 30%, subject to true-up following a closer examination of the issue in the Second Network Elements Proceeding. Characterizing the proposal as a "modest" one that "has been inexplicably controversial,"⁷⁴ it suggests that parties opposing it have misunderstood the purpose of the Phase 1 studies, which were concerned with switching costs in general and not their relationship to intercarrier compensation rates, in connection with which disaggregation of switching costs into "originating" and "terminating" components is warranted.

Several CLECs, including AT&T, Lightpath, and Global NAPs, suggest that the vertical features proposal, which applies to all traffic, not only to large-volume traffic to single customers, is beyond the scope of this case and may or should be examined elsewhere. Lightpath and CTSI et al. assert as well that Bell Atlantic-New York has offered no support for its proposal, either to show that vertical features are not used in call termination or to show that the 30% adjustment is a reasonable place holder pending further

⁷⁴ Bell-Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 17.

inquiry in the Second Network Elements Proceeding.

Some CLECs question the motivation for Bell Atlantic-New York's proposal. CTSI et al. suggest that Bell Atlantic-New York is contriving to remove these costs from reciprocal compensation (so it will pay less) while leaving them in network element rates (so it will receive more). Global NAPs suggests that Bell Atlantic-New York has become concerned that reciprocal compensation rates may be too high only in light of its realization that it will have to pay compensation, not merely receive it. It sees this as a benefit of the present system's imposition on Bell Atlantic-New York of competitive pressures to establish the lowest reasonable call termination rate.⁷⁵ Frontier, in its reply brief, accepts that challenge and urges reduction of the rate to zero, that is, its replacement by bill-and-keep.

2. Non-ISP Convergent Traffic

Bell Atlantic-New York proposes to allow Meet Point B (tandem-rate) reciprocal compensation to be charged "only when traffic is being delivered or terminated (a) through a tandem point of interconnection, or (b) through facilities that are 'functionally equivalent' to a tandem. This rule should be applied symmetrically to all carriers, both CLECs and incumbents. It would call for different results, however, depending upon the type of network architecture used by the carrier in question."⁷⁶ More specifically, a CLEC would be paid tandem-rate reciprocal compensation if, like Bell Atlantic-New York itself, it installed one or more tandem switches, used them to provide an actual tandem functionality, and offered other carriers the option of interconnecting either at the tandem or at the end office. In addition, tandem rate compensation would be paid

⁷⁵ Global NAPs' Initial Brief, p. 2, n. 3.

⁷⁶ Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 20 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).

to a CLEC that did not use tandem switching but whose facilities were nevertheless functionally equivalent to a tandem switch. As the wording of its proposal suggests, Bell Atlantic-New York sees it as consistent with the doctrines of functional equivalence and symmetry, properly understood. In Bell Atlantic-New York's view, however, the functional equivalence test cannot be met for large volume one-way traffic.

The claim of functional equivalence for a tandemless network is based on the premise that long loops, SONET rings, and other facilities take the place of the tandem and provide similar functionality. But Bell Atlantic-New York maintains that such wide area functionality need not be used in delivering traffic to a small number of large volume customers (in contrast to a widely dispersed base including substantial numbers of small customers). In the former instance, the delivering carrier can use high capacity facilities having a lower per-minute cost than the voice grade facilities needed to deliver traffic to a widely dispersed group of customers. In addition, Bell Atlantic-New York cites Global NAPs' witness's statement that ISP-bound traffic makes more efficient use of switching and transport capacity than does conventional voice telephony.⁷⁷ Beyond these factors, Bell Atlantic-New York continues, delivery of traffic to a small number of large volume customers permits a carrier to avoid the costs associated with substantial numbers of idle distribution facilities.

To show that its proposal is consistent with the FCC's rule, Bell Atlantic-New York points to the rule's statement that a CLEC is entitled to tandem interconnection rates when its switch "serves a geographic area comparable to the area served by the incumbent ILEC's tandem switch"⁷⁸; and

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 24, citing Tr. 649. (Bell Atlantic-New York refers to the witness as Cablevision's rather than Global NAPs'.)

⁷⁸ 47 C.F.R. '51.711(a)(3) (emphasis supplied).

it maintains that "'serving' an area does not merely entail delivering traffic to a few customers located within that area, no matter how large it may be."⁷⁹ It may be significant in this regard that AT&T refers to the FCC's standard not as "functional equivalence," which it attributes only to our Framework Order, but as "geographic equivalence," perhaps intending in this way to counter Bell Atlantic-New York's multi-faceted view (comprising nature of service as well as geography) of functional equivalence.

Recognizing that start-up CLECs will use fewer switches and an extended loop distribution architecture as the functional equivalent of a mature ILEC network using tandems, Bell Atlantic-New York nevertheless contrasts a start-up CLEC intending to be a full service provider with one targeting large volume convergent customers. It asserts that the former will necessarily install more extensive and less efficiently used facilities and will eventually be required to install tandem switching as its network begins to resemble that of a mature ILEC; the niche player, in contrast, will not be required to make these investments. And even if the niche player changed its strategy and began to seek a general customer base, the portion of its network designed to serve convergent customers would remain more efficient.

Further reducing the cost of serving large-volume convergent customers, Bell Atlantic-New York argues, is the ability to use shorter connections between the CLEC switch and the customer, perhaps even reducing that distance to zero through collocation.

To translate the foregoing analysis into rates, Bell Atlantic-New York would use traffic ratios as a measure of functional equivalence: a high ratio would be taken to imply that the CLEC was serving a high proportion of convergent customers; a ratio close to one would suggest that the CLEC, like Bell Atlantic-New York, itself, was serving a

⁷⁹ Bell Atlantic-New York's Reply Brief, pp. 12-13.

representative distribution of customers. It proposes a ratio of 2:1 as the dividing line: Meet Point A (end-office) rates would apply where the ratio was 2:1 or greater; Meet Point B (tandem) rates would apply only where the ratio was less than 2:1. The proposal would apply to all types of convergent traffic, not merely that directed to the Internet. In Bell Atlantic-New York's view, reference to the traffic imbalance is reasonable because such an imbalance can arise only if one carrier is serving customers that receive more traffic than they originate; and it entails little administrative cost, since traffic flows in each direction are already billed. It regards the 2:1 threshold as generous, since, in principle, it would be reasonable to charge the lower rate for all traffic in excess of a 1:1 ratio.⁸⁰

Finally, Bell Atlantic-New York denies that its proposal unfairly penalizes CLECs; it applies, it says, not to particular carriers but to particular traffic. A CLEC serving that type of traffic would receive the end-office rate; a CLEC serving a broader and more dispersed group of customers might receive the tandem rate. Bell Atlantic-New York characterizes its proposal not as a penalty imposed on CLECs that focus their efforts on ISP customers, but as a means of insuring that they are not rewarded by being over compensated for their efforts.

As already suggested, CLECs take the position that Bell Atlantic-New York's understanding of functional equivalence violates the FCC's rule. CTSI et al., for example, dispute the premise that a CLEC could receive the tandem rate only if it served thousands of customers within the pertinent geographic area. They assert that "if a CLEC has facilities in place that provide tandem switch functionality capable of serving many customers in a geographic area comparable to that served by [Bell Atlantic-New York's] tandem switch, that is sufficient. Nothing more

⁸⁰ Bell Atlantic-New York's Reply Brief, p. 17.

is required under the FCC's test."⁸¹ In addition, they complain Bell Atlantic-New York is proposing to charge CLECs different rates on the basis of the types of customers they serve, contrary to the FCC's rules.⁸² Lightpath maintains the efficiencies CLECs allegedly enjoy on account of serving a small number of large customers have no application to full service providers, whose networks are built to serve a wide customer base, even if they serve ISPs as well.⁸³ Global NAPs, meanwhile, maintains that the number of customers served by the CLEC has no bearing on whether it meets the functional equivalence standard. Beyond that, it contends a CLEC can "serve" a wide geographic area by allowing its customers to collocate with it, even without constructing a fiber network traversing the area: "a CLEC may 'serve' a wide geographic area. . . by incurring the costs associated with allowing its customers that need to receive calls from such an area to collocate at [its] switch, by incurring the costs associated with deploying physical facilities to customer locations in different local calling areas throughout the LATA, or some combination of both."⁸⁴ It warns against penalizing the smallest and newest CLECs or motivating them to sign up a handful of customers in diverse locations merely to qualify for the tandem rate.

CLECs also challenge Bell Atlantic-New York's use of a 2:1 ratio as the demarcation point between the two rates, claiming it has shown no link between that traffic ratio and a CLECs termination costs. CTSI et al. cite a Maryland proceeding in which Bell Atlantic-Maryland's counsel acknowledged the ratio was "arbitrary."⁸⁵ Lightpath similarly

⁸¹ CTSI et al.'s Reply Brief, p. 9.

⁸² 47 C.F.R. '51.503(c).

⁸³ Lightpath's Reply Brief, pp. 4-5.

⁸⁴ Global NAPs' Reply Brief, p. 14.

⁸⁵ CTSI et al.'s Reply Brief, p, 7, citing Complaint of MFS

sees no factual support for the 2:1 ratio, disputing what it characterizes as Bell Atlantic-New York's view that "the interests of full-service, facilities-based CLECs are accommodated by its ratio approach."⁸⁶ It reiterates the claim that its switches serve an area at least as large as that served by a typical Bell Atlantic-New York tandem and that Bell Atlantic-New York can reach all its customers through a single point of interconnection; it therefore sees itself as meeting our test of tandem functionality as well as the FCC's, regardless of its traffic ratio.

Finally, MCIW pursues a somewhat different line of reasoning, arguing that Bell Atlantic-New York's proposal would, in effect, improperly force CLECs to install tandem switches and build inefficient networks simply to satisfy Bell Atlantic-New York's requirements.

3. ISP Traffic

Given the flexibility afforded the states by the FCC's determination that Internet traffic is exempt from reciprocal compensation, Bell Atlantic-New York argues that we would be justified in setting compensation for that traffic at zero. It cites in this regard the Massachusetts decision, noted above, that declined to mandate payment of reciprocal compensation for Internet traffic and left it to the parties to negotiate their own arrangements; it asserts that the New Jersey Commission recently reached a similar conclusion. Should we decline to take so drastic a step, Bell Atlantic-New York would recommend a rate equal to what it terms "direct variable costs."

In support of its zero-compensation proposal, Bell Atlantic-New York contends that, in principle, ISPs are interstate carriers who should pay carrier access charges.

Intelenet of Maryland Against Bell Atlantic of Maryland, Case No. 8731, Hearing Proceedings (April 14, 1999) Tr. 167-168.

⁸⁶ Lightpath's Reply Brief, p. 6.

Because the FCC has exempted them from access charges, however, both the originating and terminating LECs are undercompensated. Asserting, with illustrations, that Bell Atlantic-New York's revenues from its customers who place calls to ISPs tend to be below cost, it argues that requiring it to pay intercarrier compensation to the terminating carrier makes a bad situation worse and requires "ILECs [to] remit to CLECs revenues that they never receive";⁸⁷ it would be better in its view "for the Commission to restrict both LECs to the local exchange revenues each receives from its customer (in the case of the originating LEC, the local charges the Internet user pays; in the case of the LEC delivering the call to the ISP, the local charge the ISP pays). This proposal is competitively neutral as between the two involved LECs."⁸⁸ Bell Atlantic-New York regards a zero rate as further justified by the abusive tactics of those CLECs using ISP traffic to generate reciprocal compensation revenue streams, as discussed earlier. Noting the claim that CLECs' termination of calls enables ILECs to avoid the cost of termination, Bell Atlantic-New York contends that intercarrier compensation is not based on avoided costs; it is designed to compensate the terminating carrier for the costs it incurs.

Bell Atlantic-New York's alternative proposal for ISP traffic would take the current Meet Point A and Meet Point B rate levels (reduced to eliminate vertical feature costs in accordance with its first proposal) and adjust them to remove investment costs (depreciation and return) and joint and common costs, all of which are included in the TELRIC analysis that forms the basis for the existing rates. (It denies such rates would be confiscatory, inasmuch as the CLEC could recover its costs from its ISP customer.) The precise rate levels would be determined in the Second Network Elements

⁸⁷ Bell Atlantic-New York's Reply Brief, p. 20.

⁸⁸ Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 36 (emphasis in original).

Proceeding, but Bell Atlantic-New York suggests interim rates based on the record of the First Network Elements Proceeding.

Noting that CLECs have argued that reduced compensation rates for Internet traffic would deter Internet growth, Bell Atlantic-New York asserts that ISPs already benefit from their exemption from interstate access charges, and it cites the Massachusetts Commission's observations that the Internet is powerful enough to stand on its own and that eliminating the subsidies produced by regulatory distortion would encourage efficient investment in Internet and other technology.

Administering these proposals would require a means to identify Internet traffic, and Bell Atlantic-New York, consistent with its view of burden of proof in this case, would impose the burden of identifying the traffic on the CLEC. In the absence of a showing by the CLEC, Bell Atlantic-New York would presume all convergent traffic (i.e., all traffic in excess of its proposed 2:1 ratio discussed in the previous section) to be Internet traffic.

CLECs press various arguments in response. e.spire/Intermedia dispute the premise that states are free to set below-TELRIC rates for ISP traffic, contending that the FCC ISP Ruling granted them, until a final federal rule is promulgated, only "the authority under section 252 of the [1996] Act to determine intercarrier compensation rates for ISP-bound traffic."⁸⁹ In its view, the reference to '252 requires TELRIC-based rates for ISP traffic. CTSI et al. and Global NAPs dispute Bell Atlantic-New York's reference to the Massachusetts ISP decision, the former noting that the portions it relies on are disputed dicta and the latter citing the many states that, in contrast to Massachusetts (and, more recently New Jersey), have held ISPs to be no different from other calls with regard to reciprocal compensation. CTSI et al. also note the FCC's statement in its ISP ruling that CLECs

⁸⁹ e.spire/Intermedia's Initial Brief, p. 11, citing the FCC ISP Ruling, &25 (emphasis supplied).

incur costs to deliver ISP traffic and that some compensation is warranted to enable them to recover those costs.⁹⁰

Global NAPs disputes the relevance of Bell Atlantic-New York's allegations that it fails to recover its costs of originating ISP-bound calls, arguing that they are no different in this regard from all other local calls with longer-than-average holding times. In its view, the only pertinent question is whether local calling revenues overall suffice to recover the costs of local calling; it charges that Bell Atlantic-New York would have "CLECs . . . made into indentured servants for Bell Atlantic-New York's end-users who, after all, are the source of both the costs and the revenues at issue here."⁹¹ (Bell Atlantic-New York maintains, however, that its local calling rates were set before the advent of the Internet and are now capped under its Performance Regulation Plan.) Global NAPs argues as well that if all CLECs that served ISP customers disappeared, Bell Atlantic-New York's costs would increase by more than it would save by avoiding reciprocal compensation payments, for it would have to augment its own network to complete the calls directed to ISPs. Bell Atlantic-New York's proposal therefore

⁹⁰ FCC ISP Ruling, &29.

⁹¹ Global NAPs' Reply Brief, p. 15. Global NAPs supports reciprocal compensation in part on the premise that local calling is "sent paid," that is, the originating carrier is to collect from the end-user revenues adequate to deliver the call to its destination. If a different carrier terminates that call, those revenues should be shared so the terminating carrier can recover its costs. (Global NAPs' Initial Brief, pp. 3-4.) BA takes the view that any such sharing, if applied pro rata (on the basis of each carrier's costs) to existing originating revenues would produce reciprocal compensation payments below current end-office rates. It therefore regards Global NAPs reasoning as suggesting a remedy that, while not a substitute for its own proposal, "at least would eliminate the absurd and anti-competitive requirement that originating ILECs remit to CLECs revenues that they never receive and that are below the originating ILECs' costs." (Bell Atlantic-New York's Reply Brief, p. 20.)

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would grant Bell Atlantic-New York a windfall by permitting it to continue to avoid those costs while freeing it of any (or most) of its reciprocal compensation obligation.

Finally, the Attorney General asserts that by entering the market for ISP-bound traffic, CLECs have contributed to the greater availability of Internet access to end-users. He suggests that "changing or abandoning reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic could have the detrimental effect of limiting consumer choice in securing internet access, and increasing the price of such service, which in turn might limit the number of New York consumers who can avail themselves of internet access. The Commission should avoid this result."⁹²

⁹² Attorney General's Reply Brief, p. 6.

4. Geographically Relevant
Interconnection Points

ISPs often ask their local exchange carriers to assign them "virtual local numbers," i.e., numbers associated with each of the local calling areas in which their customers might be located regardless of whether the ISP itself or the carrier serving it has facilities in those areas. The ISPs do so to make it convenient and cheap for their customers to place calls with long holding times to them. Bell Atlantic-New York contends that these arrangements, though not unlawful, can result in the carrier serving the ISP passing on to another carrier--usually the originating ILEC--the cost of transporting the virtual local call from the ISP's customer's local calling area to the area in which the ISP is physically located. For example, if a call is originated on Bell Atlantic-New York's network and directed to an ISP served by a CLEC, and the CLEC declines to provide Bell Atlantic-New York a point of interconnection (POI) within the originating local calling area, Bell Atlantic-New York must carry the call (and install the facilities needed to do so) to the local area in which the CLEC has a POI even though Bell Atlantic-New York "receives only local usage rates from the originating end user and nothing at all from either the CLEC or the ISP. (Indeed, far from being compensated by the CLEC for transporting its call, [Bell Atlantic-New York] is actually required to pay the CLEC intercarrier compensation for the privilege of transporting its interexchange call for free, and is being prevented by the CLEC's numbering practices from being compensated by its end user through toll charges.)"⁹³

To remedy the situation, Bell Atlantic-New York requests that all LECs be required to establish, upon the

⁹³ Bell Atlantic-New York's Initial Brief, p. 44 (emphasis in original). Bell Atlantic-New York adds that no such unfairness is imposed in the converse situation where a CLEC hands a call off to Bell Atlantic-New York for termination, inasmuch as Bell Atlantic-New York offers CLECs a POI at each of its switches.

request of any interconnected LEC, a geographically relevant interconnection point (GRIP) in every rate center in which it assigns telephone numbers, unless the interconnecting carriers negotiate alternative arrangements. The requirement would apply to all interconnections; but Bell Atlantic-New York nonetheless considers it proper to consider the matter in this proceeding, inasmuch as the underlying problems typically arise in connection with delivery of ISP and other convergent traffic. The requirement could be fulfilled either by establishing an actual physical POI or by purchasing dedicated transport from Bell Atlantic-New York at approved rates, thereby avoiding the alleged need for CLECs to deploy uneconomic new transport facilities in order to satisfy the GRIP requirement.

NYSTA, perceiving a related problem, objects more generally to the use of virtual local numbers. In its view, they improperly convert what should be a toll call into a local call, thereby denying LECs and inter-exchange carriers the toll and access charges that would be associated with a toll call. NYSTA would regard the location of the end-user requesting the NXX code (and not, as in the GRIPs proposal, the location of the POI) as determining whether to treat the call as local or toll. CTSI et al. respond that the general matter of virtual NXX codes is beyond the scope of this proceeding and that, in any event, Bell Atlantic-New York has acknowledged that their use is lawful.

CPB objects to the GRIPs proposal on the grounds that it would require CLECs to undertake substantial investments in areas where they have few customers, frustrating the development of efficient CLEC networks. It nevertheless observes that Bell Atlantic-New York's underlying concern "appears valid,"⁹⁴ and it suggests a more efficient way to deal with it would be to allow Bell Atlantic-New York to charge a TELRIC-based per-mile fee for any additional trunking

⁹⁴ CPB's Initial Brief, p. 22.

costs Bell Atlantic-New York incurs to deliver the calls at issue to CLECs. Taking strikingly different views of CPB's position, AT&T responds by asserting that CPB joins it in regarding the GRIPs proposal as anti-competitive and inefficient; Bell Atlantic-New York says "the statutory representative of the State's consumers" recognizes the problem Bell Atlantic-New York raises and "offers a solution not inconsistent with [Bell Atlantic-New York's own] proposal."⁹⁵ It adds that the rates contemplated by CPB are the interoffice transport rates set in the First Network Elements Proceeding.

Several CLECs object strenuously to both GRIPs and the mileage-fee alternative. Global NAPs sees them as efforts to undermine the pro-competitive regime established by the 1996 Act, which offsets the ILECs' market advantages by allowing CLECs to decide whether to interconnect at one point or many, denying that choice to the ILECs (meaning that an ILEC can be required to deliver all traffic to a single point designated by the CLEC), and forbidding an ILEC to charge a CLEC for the privilege of receiving its traffic. Meanwhile, Bell Atlantic-New York is obligated to deliver to a CLEC traffic originated by its own customers and directed to the CLEC's customers, and it cannot complain of the costs of doing so (though it is free, Global NAPs suggests, to charge its end-users a rate that covers those costs). Global NAPs (and other CLECs) add that the cost of transporting traffic is, in any event, modest; Bell Atlantic-New York acknowledges that transport costs are insensitive to distance but contends it incurs fixed costs in delivering the traffic over dedicated trunks.

⁹⁵ AT&T's Reply Brief, p. 11, Bell Atlantic-New York's Reply Brief, p. 21.

Frontier's Proposals⁹⁶

1. Internet Traffic

Citing the flexibility afforded the states with regard to Internet traffic by the recent FCC decision and the absence of any "basis in law or policy to require ILECs to subsidize ISPs by allowing ISPs to water at the reciprocal compensation trough,"⁹⁷ Frontier proposes that there be no reciprocal compensation for traffic to ISPs on any network and that such traffic be handled on a bill-and-keep basis. Beyond that, it urges us to prohibit the discriminatory offering of discounted local exchange services to ISPs on the basis of their incoming traffic patterns as well as the discriminatory sharing of reciprocal compensation payments between carriers and ISPs.

Should we reject this primary proposal, Frontier would recommend compensation for Internet traffic priced at the ILECs "incremental (TELRIC) tandem switching cost."⁹⁸ As a further alternative, Frontier suggests that where the incoming to outgoing traffic ratio is 2:1 or greater for three successive months, reciprocal compensation be reduced to the tandem switching rate (as defined in the preceding footnote) until the ratio has dropped below 2:1 for three successive months.

⁹⁶ Relatively few parties respond specifically to Frontier, for the arguments directed at Bell Atlantic-New York's proposals for the most part apply to Frontier's as well. Accordingly, no specific responses are reported in this section; but it should not be inferred that Frontier's proposals are unopposed.

⁹⁷ Frontier's Initial Brief, p. 8.

⁹⁸ As already suggested, Frontier seems to be referring here to the narrowly defined tandem switching cost itself, thereby intending to exclude the trunking, trunk port, and end office switch usage components of, for example, Bell Atlantic-New York's Meet Point B (tandem) rate; because of efficiencies of scale, per-unit tandem switch usage, so limited, is less costly than per-unit end-office switch usage. This accounts for Frontier's reference to tandem

2. Other Convergent Traffic

Refusing to concede as a legal matter that we are obligated to set reciprocal compensation rates for convergent traffic on the basis of the ILEC's costs, Frontier urges us to do so on the basis of the CLECs costs, reduced by the monthly revenues paid by the ISP to the CLEC for incoming traffic. (The premise of that reduction appears to be that the rates paid by a customer, including an ISP, are intended to cover both incoming and outgoing calling. Because an ISP imposes no costs related to outgoing traffic, the full amount of its payment defrays the termination costs that reciprocal compensation is also intended to cover.)

Should we nevertheless continue to use the ILEC's costs as the basis for reciprocal compensation, Frontier would set the rate at the ILEC's tandem switching costs (once again as defined above), on the premise that when a CLEC terminates traffic to a convergent customer's platform, the CLEC switch is acting as a tandem: it receives traffic only from other switches and terminates the traffic using large trunk-side connections. Frontier regards these as the hallmarks of tandem, not end-office switching and it sees "no reason for the Commission to pretend that the CLEC is performing anything like the widely-distributed and far-flung end-office switching that the ILEC performs when terminating small volumes of traffic to the thousands of customers and large service territories served by most ILEC switches."⁹⁹

Time Warner's Proposal

cost as a lower rather than a higher figure; it portrays the higher alternative (analogous to Bell Atlantic-New York's Meet Point B rate) as "tandem switching plus local switching." (Frontier's Reply Brief, p. 1. See also Bell Atlantic-New York's Reply Brief, p. 11, n. 19.)

⁹⁹ Frontier's Initial Brief, pp. 10-11.

Time Warner regards the ideal to be a blended rate negotiated between the two carriers; by its very nature, a blended rate, which is adjusted downward as the CLEC's network evolves, fully accounts for that evolution and for traffic flows. Time Warner suggests that "the fact that a CLEC has accepted a blended rate provides solid evidence that it has adequately and responsibly built out its network in support of its originating traffic and the public switched network."¹⁰⁰

Where a negotiated blended rate does not apply, Time Warner suggests a framework for dealing with convergent traffic that takes account of both the CLEC's network configuration and its traffic ratio. It distinguishes among CLEC networks on the basis of their points of interconnection with the ILEC, and, for each level, uses a different traffic ratio to determine whether the reciprocal compensation rate is to be at the tandem or at the lower, convergent traffic, rate.

CLECs at Level 1, new to a LATA, will have only a single point of interconnection (POI) and their traffic ratios will likely be out of balance even if they do not serve primarily convergent customers. Accordingly, reciprocal compensation would be at the tandem rate for traffic within a 5:1 ratio; traffic above that ratio would be assumed to be convergent and the lower, convergent rate would apply. At Level 2, a CLEC would have three or four points of interconnection, and compensation for traffic exchanged at those POI's would be at the end-office rate. For traffic exchanged at tandems, the tandem rate would apply only where there was a traffic ratio less than 10:1; in other instances, the convergent rate would apply. Finally, where the CLEC has more than five points of interconnection (Level 3), the convergent rate would apply to traffic delivered at a tandem only when the traffic ratio exceeded 15:1. Time Warner suggests that the Level 2 and Level 3 arrangements would apply

¹⁰⁰ Time Warner's Initial Brief, p. 8 (footnote omitted).

relatively rarely, since in most of those instances the carriers would have negotiated a blended rate.

Time Warner asserts that its proposal is consistent with both state and federal law and with our goal of encouraging competition in the local exchange market. It reasons that we are free to determine that different proxy rates may apply to different network configurations, which may impose different costs. By taking into account traffic ratios and points of interconnection, Time Warner continues, its proposal "also promotes investment in facilities-based networks, which ultimately benefits consumers through increased real competition."¹⁰¹ Time Warner stresses that it uses the traffic ratios not to directly infer information about traffic termination costs but only as a proxy to determine the likelihood that convergent traffic exists. It recognizes the tentative nature of the traffic ratios and point-of-interconnection trigger points used in its proposal, and offers to participate in any forum we may wish to convene to reach consensus on modifications to its proposal.

Finally, Time Warner objects to any proposed reciprocal compensation rate of zero, noting that carriers incur real costs when terminating any type of traffic.

In response, Bell Atlantic-New York "applaud[s] Time Warner's recognition that a problem exists,"¹⁰² but says the proposal does little to alleviate it. In general, Bell Atlantic-New York believes the deployment of multiple interconnection points would not affect its showing that convergent traffic is less costly to deliver; specifically, it believes the number of interconnection points used by Time Warner is too low and its traffic exchange ratios too high.

¹⁰¹ Time Warner's Initial Brief, p. 17.

¹⁰² Bell Atlantic-New York's Reply Brief, p. 18.

Although MCI's primary position is to favor maintenance of the reciprocal compensation status quo, it suggests that extremely high traffic ratios could be used to trigger an audit, which would then determine whether the CLEC's network configuration warranted allowing it to charge the tandem rate for reciprocal compensation. It suggests that a traffic imbalance exceeding 100:1 (including all minutes exchanged, not just local minutes) could trigger such an audit.¹⁰³ MCI notes that this proposal would be consistent with the FCC's rule that allows a state commission to determine whether an individual CLEC is entitled to the tandem rate, taking account of economically relevant considerations-- primarily the geographic coverage of the CLECs switch.¹⁰⁴ It would go no further than this, however, in ascribing significance to traffic ratios.

Time Warner responds that MCI's proposal, like its own, uses traffic ratios as a trigger. But it believes the individual audits that would be triggered under MCI's proposal would create uncertainty and impose administrative burdens, while failing to facilitate low-cost competitive entry.

¹⁰³ MCI's Initial Brief, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴ 47 C.F.R. '51.711.

CPB reaffirms that reciprocal compensation rates should be based on TELRIC and should be symmetrical. In its view, however, they also "should be deaveraged to reflect the significant differences in the underlying costs of terminating various types of traffic."¹⁰⁵ It cites record evidence¹⁰⁶ that termination of traffic to ISPs requires at most a single switch instead of the multiple switches required by tandem functionality and that, in such instances, tandem rate elements should not be applicable.

Because of the administrative burdens and costs of determining the functionality associated with the termination of costs to each customer or type of customer for each CLEC, CPB proposes, instead, what it characterizes as "a variant of the traffic flow imbalance approach proposed by [Bell Atlantic-New York] and implicit in questions posed by Staff."¹⁰⁷ It suggests that where a carrier's incoming to outgoing traffic ratio exceeds some threshold, perhaps 5:1, reciprocal compensation would not be set on the basis of tandem functionality unless the carrier could show that it was providing tandem functionality notwithstanding its traffic ratio. CPB regards traffic imbalance as a suitable proxy for identifying tandem functionality because carriers having high traffic ratios "serve predominantly ISPs and other large volume customers, instead of a large number of geographically dispersed customers. Compensation received by such carriers should not include tandem rate elements."¹⁰⁸

An importantly distinguishing feature of CPBs proposal is that it would not use traffic imbalance to

¹⁰⁵ CPB's Initial Brief, p. 17.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 16, citing Tr. 199-200. See also Tr. 180, to the effect that CLECs commonly use a single-switch architecture.

¹⁰⁷ CPB's Initial Brief, p. 18.

¹⁰⁸ Id.

determine the reciprocal compensation rate until the ILEC's local market was fully open to competition. Only then, CPB reasons, will CLECs be able to attract a large volume of customers, including those who originate call to ISPs; and only then, therefore, will it be possible to infer the absence of tandem functionality from the existence of a traffic imbalance.

CPB urges as well that any new reciprocal compensation arrangement be preceded by a transition period sufficient to prevent unnecessary disruption of CLECs' businesses and avoid penalizing them for having responded to incentives created by the previous regulatory structure. CPB suggests that the transition period could be as short as six months if the new arrangements were delayed until ILEC markets are fully open to competition; if the change were made before markets are fully opened, the transition period should last at least one year. Stressing its unique status as a non-industry party, CPB maintains its proposal is fair to all concerned--CLECs, ILECs, customers originating calls, and customers receiving them.

As already noted, both AT&T and Bell Atlantic-New York stress the aspects of their respective positions that CPB appears to endorse.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In General

In assessing the significance of the traffic imbalances that are so much at issue here, one must begin with the very basic point that reciprocal compensation was chosen over bill-and-keep in part because some imbalances were seen as likely. The ILECs' earlier advocacy of reciprocal compensation over bill-and-keep does not legally estop them from now urging changes in reciprocal compensation, or even its total abandonment; but it does suggest at least that the existence of imbalances should not be seen by them as a complete surprise. Of course, the imbalances are greater than

those that were anticipated, clearly producing unexpectedly large flows of revenues in one direction, and the question is what, if anything, to do about it.

The parties have presented two related ways of looking at that question. The first emphasizes the economic soundness (and legal requirement) that reciprocal compensation rates be grounded in costs and attempts to determine what, if anything, the traffic imbalances imply about those costs. The other point of view looks to the causes of the imbalances and attempts to assess their virtue: the ILECs accuse the CLECs of having found a way to game the system, and the CLECs protest that the ILECs' intransigence about opening mass markets has left them no choice but to pursue a profitable niche--either as an end in itself or as a means of gaining the strength needed to attempt full entry. The second type of analysis is related to the first; for when all is said and done, changes in rates can and should be made primarily with an eye to costs. But it maintains, nonetheless, that these decisions should take account of the players' motivations.

In this regard, CPB provides useful perspective in its presentation of the many factors underlying the traffic imbalances. CLECs have pursued ISP and other convergent traffic customers for multiple reasons: because reasonable and honest business plans might suggest doing so; because ILECs may not have opened mass markets as quickly and effectively as they might have; and because current reciprocal compensation arrangements may unintentionally overcompensate carriers that terminate calls to convergent customers. From the perspective of this proceeding, however, it is this last factor that is primary. We have no need to judge motives; and the ILECs' alacrity in opening markets is under review in other cases. What we must do here, simply, is to determine whether the current regulatory regime provides for reciprocal compensation at rates that fail to properly track costs, thereby skewing the market by creating unintended, uneconomic incentives to the pursuit of ISP and other convergent customers as a means

by which CLECs can draw above-cost revenues from ILECs.

The record as a whole suggests that the costs of serving a small number of large, convergent customers will likely be lower than the costs of serving a mass market. This is not to say that every CLEC with a traffic imbalance has, in fact, lower costs; much will depend on the configuration of the CLEC's network and the customers it is designed to serve (as distinct from those it actually serves at a particular time). As a general rule, however, large convergent customers can be served via more efficient, higher capacity facilities, and those facilities will likely have less idle time. Bell Atlantic-New York correctly argues that "functional equivalence" does not require conclusively presuming that the costs of serving a small number of large customers located around a geographic area are no less than the costs of serving the mass market within that geographic area; notwithstanding AT&T's characterization of the standard as "geographic equivalence," it remains one of "functional equivalence," taking account, as Bell Atlantic-New York suggests, of how the CLEC "serves" the area and not merely of the area's size.

This is not to say, of course, that each CLEC's costs must be examined. For good reason, the pertinent costs are those of the ILEC, unless the CLEC chooses to come in with a study showing its costs are higher. But if a CLEC's network is one that is not functionally equivalent to an ILEC's tandem, the law permits, and economic policy suggests, that the CLEC not be compensated at tandem rates. And there may be situations in which a traffic imbalance suggests an absence of tandem functionality.

In sum, the reciprocal compensation system is not fundamentally broken, but neither is it operating wholly satisfactorily. There is need for adjustment short of total overhaul, and the proposals in this proceeding should be assessed in that light.

Vertical Features

Bell Atlantic-New York's vertical features proposal makes considerable sense in the abstract; if these features are not used in terminating traffic, their costs should not be reflected in reciprocal compensation rates. Bell Atlantic-New York itself recognizes that the costs at issue cannot be measured until the conclusion of the Second Network Elements Proceeding and it therefore proposes a placeholder estimate of 30%. But it offers no support for that placeholder, and we see no basis for accepting it.

Accordingly, the proposal is rejected for now. It may be considered again at the conclusion of the Second Network Elements Proceeding, in which the costs associated with vertical features can be further considered. In addition, Bell Atlantic-New York may propose, in its compliance filing in this proceeding, a better supported placeholder for immediate use in removing the costs of vertical features from reciprocal compensation rates. Other parties will be permitted to comment on any such proposal, and, if the support for the placeholder is persuasive, the rates will be adjusted accordingly.

Convergent Traffic

As already suggested, a significant traffic imbalance suggests a preponderance of convergent traffic. There may be, of course, other reasons for traffic imbalances, particularly in the case of relatively new CLECs; and the 2:1 traffic ratio proposed by Bell Atlantic-New York is not high enough to trigger remedial action. Once the ratio reaches 3:1, however, the inference of predominantly convergent traffic becomes stronger and, in turn, implies, without demonstrating conclusively, greater efficiency and lower costs in the termination of traffic. That inference of lower costs cannot be disregarded if compensation is to be cost-based; at the same time, it is not conclusive enough to have a definitive effect on rates.

An inference of this sort can be effectively handled

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by a rebuttable presumption, in a manner similar to that suggested by CPB. If a carrier's incoming to outgoing traffic ratio exceeds 3:1 for the most recent three-month period, it is fair to presume that a substantial portion of its traffic is convergent, costing less to terminate, and that delivery of that traffic therefore should be compensated at end-office (in the Bell Atlantic-New York context, Meet Point A) rather than tandem (Meet Point B) rates. The end-office rate should apply to the portion of the traffic that exceeds the stated ratio, and the tandem rate should continue to apply to the portion of the traffic below that ratio. (In effect, the compensation would be at the blended rate characteristic of many interconnection agreements.)

The CLEC whose compensation is so adjusted will be permitted, however, to rebut the presumption with a suitable showing that its network and service are such as to warrant tandem-rate compensation for all traffic. Most of the factors to be considered in any such showing would go to the carrier's overall network design and take account of whether the network has tandem-like functionality that enables it to send, as well as receive, traffic. The network design factors to be considered include, but are not limited to:

the number and capacity of central office switches;

the number of points of interconnection offered to other local exchange carriers;

the number of collocation cages;

the presence of SONET rings and other types of transport facilities;

the presence of local distribution facilities such as coaxial cable and/or unbundled loops.

The presence of some or all of these network components in substantial quantities would demonstrate that the carrier in question was investing in a network with tandem-like functionality, designed to both send and receive

customer traffic. Multiple interconnection points, collocation cages, SONET rings and other types of transport facilities in various combinations are all evidence of a network being built out to reach a dispersed customer base. Collocation cages along with the use of unbundled loops are a clear indication the carrier intends to serve residential and small business customers. The presence of the network design features would be more important than actual numbers of residential and business customers served given the newness of the competitive local exchange market.

If a carrier subject to the presumption succeeds in rebutting it, the compensation paid to the carrier will revert to its previous, higher, level. In addition, the carrier will be made whole for the difference between the higher and lower compensation rates for the interval going back to its filing of its rebuttal presentation. These arrangements should be set forth in all tariffs that contain reciprocal compensation provisions.

ISP Traffic

Even if the FCC ISP Ruling affords us the discretion to adopt either of Bell Atlantic-New York's proposals, we see no sound reason to treat ISP traffic differently from other convergent traffic. For one thing, the FCC ISP Ruling is not the FCC's last word on the subject, and a regulatory regime based on it might have to be changed yet again before too long. More substantively, Bell Atlantic-New York has shown no reason to treat ISP traffic differently from other convergent traffic, and its specific proposals are similarly unsupportable. To deny all compensation for ISP termination would be to unfairly ignore the indisputable fact that CLECs completing these calls incur costs in doing so; and even if ISPs in concept resemble interexchange carriers that should recover their costs through carrier access charges, current federal law prevents them from doing so. Meanwhile, Bell Atlantic-New York's direct variable cost proposal, though less

harsh, is poorly supported. There appears to be no reason to abandon TELRIC costing in this context, and the rebuttable presumption regime adopted for convergent traffic in general can address any legitimate concerns associated with ISP traffic. At the same time, it would be wrong to exempt ISP traffic from this remedy to promote Internet access, as the Attorney General may be suggesting. For all these reasons, no special reciprocal compensation rates will be set for Internet-bound traffic; it will be treated the same as other convergent traffic (i.e., in accordance with the remedy adopted under the preceding heading).

GRIPs

NYSTA's broad concern related to virtual NXX codes goes beyond the scope of this proceeding and need not be considered further. Bell Atlantic-New York's more limited proposal, to require CLECs to establish GRIPs or else reimburse Bell Atlantic-New York for the cost of hauling traffic from the virtual NXX to the interconnection point, is properly within the proceeding, for it bears directly on reciprocal compensation levels.

On its face, Bell Atlantic-New York makes a good case for the fairness of its proposal, which is designed to spare it the cost of, in effect, subsidizing a CLEC's use of virtual NXXs. The CLECs respond that federal law gives them, for good pro-competitive reasons, considerable discretion with regard to selecting points of interconnection and requires the originating carrier to bear the cost of hauling traffic to the point of interconnection. But while federal law likely affords us more discretion here than the CLECs say,¹⁰⁹ there appears to be no need to superimpose a GRIPs-type remedy on

¹⁰⁹ For example, the FCC has said that "a requesting carrier that wished a 'technically feasible' but expensive interconnection would . . . be required to bear the cost of that interconnection, including a reasonable profit." (Local Competition Order &199.)

the convergent traffic remedy already adopted. Any additional benefits to Bell Atlantic-New York would be relatively minor, and the unintended effects on access to the Internet from remote areas could be substantial. The GRIPs proposal therefore will be rejected, at least for now, though it may be raised again in the Second Network Elements Proceeding.

Time Warner's Proposal

Time Warner's proposal, though creative, would require considerably more elaboration and refinement before its adoption could be considered. (Time Warner itself seems to recognize as much in its offer to participate in further forums regarding the proposal.) It appears, however, that those additional efforts are unnecessary, inasmuch as the course of action we are taking here adequately deals with the deficiencies identified in the existing reciprocal compensation regime. Accordingly, Time Warner's proposal will not be further pursued at this time.

Implementation

CPB suggests deferring any action until we are satisfied that local markets have been fully opened to competition, but there appears to be no need to impose any such condition on a remedy growing out of an immediate concern. Bell Atlantic-New York's opening of its market, of course, is under review in Case 97-C-0271, which provides adequate oversight of the matter, and Frontier's actions likewise are being considered in other proceedings.

The need for a transition period, advocated by most CLECs, also is questionable at best. Carriers have been on notice at least since this case began that changes might be in the offing, and those changes can take effect without any further transition period.

Finally, we emphasize that the decisions reached in this proceeding do not modify the terms of existing contracts except to the extent those contracts, by their own terms,

incorporate or defer to the tariffs affected by the determinations reached here. Contracts (and parties to them) being what they are, there may be some disputes about how that rule is applied, but there is no way we can anticipate all such disputes or attempt to resolve them in advance. On the specific issue of ISP traffic, however, as raised in the exchange between Bell Atlantic-New York and Lightpath, we see no basis for excluding ISP traffic from reciprocal compensation pursuant to an existing interconnection agreement unless the agreement explicitly so provides. Without such an explicit provision, there is no reason to assume that the parties intended their agreement to be modified by a regulatory decision regarding the character of ISP traffic.

The Commission orders:

1. Within 10 days after the date of this opinion and order, any local exchange carrier whose tariffs contain provisions related to reciprocal compensation shall file amendments to those tariffs consistent with this opinion and order and shall serve a copy of those amendments on each active party to this proceeding. Such tariff amendments shall not take effect on a permanent basis until approved by the Commission; but, except as provided in the next ordering clause, such amendments shall take effect on a temporary basis, subject to refund or reparation, not later than 15 days after the date of this opinion and order. Except as provided in the next ordering clause, any party wishing to comment on any compliance filing may do so within 15 days after the date of the filing, submitting 15 copies of its comments.

2. If New York Telephone Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-New York includes in its compliance filing a revised proposal to remove from reciprocal compensation rates the costs of vertical switching services, comments on that proposal will be due not later than 30 days after the date of the filing. Any party filing such comments should submit 15 copies. No such proposal shall take effect without the

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approval of the Commission.

3. For good cause shown pursuant to Public Service Law '92(2), newspaper publication of the tariff amendments filed in accordance with this opinion and order is waived.

4. This proceeding is continued.

By The Commission,

(SIGNED)

DEBRA RENNER
Acting Secretary

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PARTIES AND THEIR FILINGS

(An "X" indicates the party submitted the filing in question;
see Endnote for information on joint filings)

<u>PARTY</u> ¹¹⁰	<u>SHORT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>THRESHOLD TESTIMONY</u>	<u>INITIAL TESTIMONY</u>	<u>RESPONSIVE TESTIMONY</u>	<u>INITIAL BRIEF</u>	<u>REPLY BRIEF</u>
AT&T Communications of New York, Inc.	AT&T	X	X	X	X	X
NYS Attorney General	Attorney General					X
New York Telephone Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-New York	Bell Atlantic-New York	X	X	X	X	X
Cable Television and Telecommunications Association of New York, Inc.	Cable Association		X		X	
Citizens Telecommunications Company of New York, Inc.	Citizens	X	X			X
Competitive Telecommunications Association	CompTel				X	
NYS Consumer Protection Board	CPB				X	X
CTSI, Inc.	CTSI	X	X	X	X	X
e.spire Communications Inc.	e.spire	X	X	X	X	X
Focal Communications Corporation	Focal	X	X	X	X	X
Frontier Telephone of Rochester, Inc.	Frontier	X	X		X	X

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Global NAPs, Inc.	GNAPs	X	X	X	X	X
Intermedia Communications, Inc.	Intermedia	X	X	X	X	X
Internet Communication LLC	Internet	X				
Cablevision Lightpath, Inc.	Lightpath	X	X	X	X	X
MCI WorldCom, Inc.	MCIW	X	X	X	X	X
Mid-Hudson Communications, Inc.	Mid-Hudson	X	X		X	
Northland Networks, Ltd	Northland				X	
NYS Telecommunications Association, Inc.	NYSTA				X	X
PaeTec Communications, Inc.	PaeTec	X	X		X	X
RCN Telecom Services, Inc.	RCN	X	X	X	X	X
<u>Sprint Communications</u>	Sprint				X	

¹¹¹

Responded to request by noting that it neither pays nor receives

Company L.P.

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APPENDIX B

PARTIES AND THEIR FILINGS

(an "X" indicates the party submitted the filing in question;
see Endnote for information on joint filings)

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>SHORT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>THRESHOLD TESTIMONY</u>	<u>INITIAL TESTIMONY</u>	<u>RESPONSIVE TESTIMONY</u>	<u>INITIAL BRIEF</u>	<u>REPLY BRIEF</u>
Time Warner Telecom, Inc.	Time Warner	X	X	X	X	X
Telecommunications Resellers Association	TRA				X	
Warwick Valley Telephone Co.	Warwick	X				

ENDNOTE

CTSI, Focal, PaeTec, and RCN submitted joint briefs; they are referred to as "CTSI et al."
e.spire and Intermedia submitted joint briefs; they are referred to as "e.spire/Intermedia."
Mid-Hudson and Northland submitted a joint brief; they are referred to as "Mid-Hudson/Northland."

reciprocal compensation in New York inasmuch as it does not yet operate as a competitive local exchange carrier within the State.